Attempt to falsify the historical interpretation still valid today: After receiving the report of his families deportation from Hannover to Poland Herschel Grynszpan went to the German Embassy in Paris two days before the Kristallnacht to take revenge. He demanded to see a high ranking civil servant and was guided to Ernst vom Rath, third secretary of the Embassy, whom he shot. The assassination of the German diplomat, member of the Nazi party NSDAP, initiated the Kristallnacht.

0.

Task

0.1.

General
The today's generally accepted version (thesis) of this assassination clinches with numerous available reports (facts). These facts are listed here to falsify the common view of the events of November 7th,1938 (thesis). However for the time being it is not yet possible to construct a different view of these events (antithesis).

0.2.

Method
Common procedure in physics, and since Karl Popper in all sciences, is to confront the thesis with facts and views not corresponding with the thesis. Should this evaluation result in a falsification the thesis then becomes inaccurate.

0.3.

Alternative view (antithesis)
Here the focus is on falsifying the thesis of Grynszpan as "Alleintäter" (single-perpetrator).
The focus is not on the verified wrong theses that was put in circulation by the German Authorities immediately after the event that states Grynszpan acted on behalf of the International Jewish Community.
My hypothetical antithesis is my suspicion of German Authorities, namely Reinhard Heydrich and his SD having had a finger in the pie. I have no proves yet. If I am right it will be almost impossible to prove it as I would need to find evidence of Heydrich's actions that was not destroyed immediately after the events. Heydrich's aim and mission was always "action without a trace". Only by missing his aim Heydrich would have made a mistake and left a trace.
This falsification is purely analytical with the goal to prove that the events of November 7th-10th happened differently and that it could not have happened the way the false traces suggest us to believe.
If this falsification succeeds I have the prove that the generally accepted version is not correct. But I would still not yet know what really happened. This might be a unsatisfactory situation only knowing how it was not and not knowing how it was. The great number of contemporary comments doubting the thesis at the time without offering prove or facts can not be accepted as antithesis but is open to falsification again. My hypothetical antithesis too should be submitted to falsification..

0.4.

Statement
Events, reports, reflections, interpretations of third parties (facts) useful to falsify the thesis are listed here 1. - 4.:

  1. General: General reflections regarding the assassination as a whole and the connections to the alleged consecutive events

  2. Before: Relating events before the morning of November 7th, 1938 that support the falsification

  3. During: Description of contradicting events between November 7th and November 10th, 1938

  4. Afterwards: Description of events after November 10th, 1938 that do not correspond to the thesis

Existing documents are found in the appendix by links.

0.5.

Opinions of esteemed survivors and eye-witnesses of the Holocaust
It is conspicuous that highly critical persons with a developed historical sense and great experiences like Robert M. W. Kempner, Gerhard M. Riegner and Simon Wiesenthal have shown great restraint towards the official presentation of the historical events. They list and mention facts questioning the thesis. Their doubts together with further facts are part of this inventory. The conclusion of the three above mentioned eye-witnesses are not very strict and thorough. For my part I rely on their realisation: "There seems to be something wrong". Their doubts nourish my suspicions. If they could examine my falsification I would surely learn important details and adjustments from them.

1.

1. General facts of the falsification

1.1.

The Pogrom and reason for the pogrom
If the sole connection between the events of November 7th, 1938 (the assassination) and the events of November 9th and 10th (the pogrom) was that the first event set off the second (either in reality or as a welcomed excuse), then it would be the first pogrom against the Jews in history where the corpse was delivered not by the perpetrators but by the Jews themselves. The long history of pogroms against the Jews shows that if there was a corpse involved it was always a foisted one.
If this fact is also valid for pogroms against other parties it is a subject still to be investigated.
If the pogrom of November 1938 is really the first pogrom against Jews in world history without a foisted cause (i.e. a person killed by a Jew) then this fact has not yet been acknowledged anywhere. However this would probably be an aspect of far greater importance than the fact that the November 1938 pogrom was the most wide spread pogrom of all time.

1.2.

Connection to the pattern David Frankfurter / Wilhelm Gustloff in Davos, Switzerland
Vom Rath's assassination by Grynszpan is in many ways similar to the assassination of Wilhelm Gustloff by David Frankfurter, even so vom Rath had a lower hierarchical status than Gustloff.
After the respective events the function of vom Rath was exaggerated while Gustloff's function was reduced. As an aristocrat and homosexual vom Rath was more of a burden and therefore conveniently vulnerable. Gustloff on the other hand had an important and clandestine task as the presumptive "Gauleiter" of Switzerland. Because of the 1936 Olympic Games the Reich and the Nazi Party could not take revenge for the great loss that Gustloff's assassination caused. (Source: Wolf-Arno Kropar "Reichskristallnacht" Wiesbaden 1997 pp 9; Ian Kershaw "Hitler 1889 - 1936 Hybris" p. 573).
The comments of the German press as well as Goebbels himself in the "Völkischer Beobachter" always stressed the connection between the two assassinations. The assassination in Paris looks like a copy of the assassination in Davos. The main difference lies in the assassins completely different structures of character. Grynszpan has not been extensively characterised. His frequent, seemingly irrational behaviours are easily explained ad hoc with his labile personality so glamorously presented.

1.3.

Situation of records - destroyed records
The records about the assassination are rather thin. There are only a few preserved records from France (Sources: Maurus p. 75; letter to me of Rita Thalman dated 10.3.1999). After the invasion the SS tracked down and collected the records at the Paris Prefect, at the Attorney of State and at the Counsel of Defence Moro-Giafferi. They then displaced them to Germany where today there are no traces left. The records of the different German Ministries were consolidated and at the same time screened. They are obviously incomplete and can be reviewed at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin. The most complete and therefore most informative records are those of the preparation of the show trial against Grynszpan.
It's obvious that many records have been destroyed and mainly those containing clandestine activities. Such records have a much higher risk of loss and therefore there is not much hope left to find records proving clandestine activities.
One of the characteristics of the Nazi regime was to not record important operations. Various orders to destroy the records and orders have been found. For example the instructions of February 16th, 1945 to destroy all anti-Jewish materials not to leave it to for the enemy (Cited from Robert M. W. Kempner "Die Wahrheit über die Reichspogromnacht" in "Niemand war dabei und keiner hat's gewusst", Serie Piper, München April 1989).
In regards to the assassination in Paris there are only the official reports of the German ambassador and an unofficial report of his servant, Nagorka. There are no remarks anywhere how the report of the German ambassador came about.

1.4.

The wording of the propaganda
Today's commonly accepted version (thesis) follows in general the direction the Ministry of Propaganda issued on November 9th, 1938. They both use almost solemnly the report of the ambassador and his servant. The extensiveness of the direction issued by the Ministry of Propaganda is shown clearly by the fact that Goebbels' wording "murder" still appears in almost all historical essays. But if the actual state of affairs corresponds with the thesis then it would not have been a murder but rather an assassination politically motivated.
Regarding the cause of the act and not regarding the "Volkszorn" we still follow the interpretation of Goebbels.
Following my interpretation of the facts described under 4., Goebbels did not know what really happened in Paris. He only stated what he thought was the truth, his lie was an objective one, not a subjective one. He dismissed the possibility of homosexuality as a strategy of Grynszpan.
Only on April 16th, 1942 did Goebbels change his point of view for the first time by pronouncing his great doubts regarding the advisability of a legal proceeding. His sole aspect was the one of the homosexuality which so far he thought was invented but controllable (Source: Gerald Schwab "The days the Holocaust began. The Odyssey of Herschel Grynszpan" New York 1990 p 174). The "truth" about the events before and on November 7th, 1938 Goebbels probably knew only shortly before April 16th, 1942. It was not Heydrich's style to inform the Minister of Propaganda about his plans and activities. The only person Heydrich informed was Hitler. It seems strange for today's interpreter that within a government, major topics were not disclosed to all the ministers, i.e. the Minister of Propaganda was not aware of the doings and plans of the Secret Services of the SD.

1.5.

Research and Literature
It should stand out that publications about the assassination in Paris still give reasons for doubts as well as soothing theories. Conversely, the assassination in Davos is no subject of research: everything is clear.

1.6.

Alternative view of history
Question: If the assassination on November 7th, 1938 would not have happened, would there have been a pogrom on November 9th? Would there have been none at all? Would one have had to wait for another occasion? Was the date of no importance?
There is no doubt that for the German policy against the Jews the assassination was ideal as if Grynszpan's hands were guided by destiny. For the organisational perspective the day was almost perfect.

1.7.

Rivalry Goebbels / SS
The rivalry between Goebbels and the SS can be added to the useful facts for the falsification of the thesis. This rivalry is traceable in many facts after November 8th, 1938. Naturally, their prove is sparsely recorded which makes it rather difficult to see through the "Befehlsstränge" (responsibilities). The fact is that Goebbels was highly responsible for the events of the night of November 9th / 10th, 1938. He was trying to improve his prestige after the unsuccessful propaganda on the "Sudetenkrise" in addition to Hitler's disapproval of a love affair (s. 3.9.).
The SS held back; on November 12th, 1938 Goebbels was reproached by Göring. As a result, the policy against the Jews was re-routed to the SS with an official link to Heydrich. Result: The "Wannseeprotokoll". (Source: Heinz Höhne "Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf", Sigbert Mohn p. 313 with cross comparisons that enlighten the chaos of the rivalries. Wolf-Arno Kropat's "Reichskristallnacht" discloses that since 1933 and especially since 1937, Heydrich and Himmler commented to the policy against the Jews with a number of reports and developed strategies to gain responsibilities").
It stays open to connect the retention of the SS with the fiasco of the "Polenaktion". But the night of the pogrom did certainly improve the image of the SS and help to cover up this fiasco of the SS. Still open for analysis is Hitler's reserved behaviour on November 9th, 1938 when, after a talk with Goebbels, he left early, did not mention the assassination in Paris and attended the state funeral of vom Rath, still without saying a word. Goebbels does not mention the assassination in Paris in his diary on November 9th,1938.

2.

Before: Facts for the falsification before November 7th, 1938

2.1.

IInstructions by the SS
In the November 3rd, 1938 edition of the "Schwarze Korps", an extraordinary article gives a wide view of the planned long term policy against the Jews and at the same time the authentic language for the events to come after November 7th. The instructions are fully understandable for the reader and were followed accordingly. If on November 7th there would not have been an assassination in Paris, the newspaper would have been humiliated. The "Schwarze Korps" was always understood to be a direct and current publisher of orders.
On page 3 of the November 3rd edition of the "Schwarze Korps" there was a list of Jewish shops on the Kurfürstendamm and in the Tauentzienstrasse in Berlin. Everyone knew which windows to break on November 9th. This article would have been meaningless without the pogrom planed. Similar instructions listing Jewish shops were published in other newspapers in different cities at the same time, but never beforehand.

2.2.

Notice in advance 1: Hörlein / Hahn / Meitner
On June 27th, 1945, Lise Meitner wrote to Otto Hahn: "You told me yourself in March, 1938 that Hörlein (Professor Heinrich Hörlein, treasurer of the Emil-Fisch Company since 1935, supporter of the Kaiser Wilhelm-Institute for chemistry) told you, that horrible things were done to the Jews. So he knew in advance about all the planned and finally executed horrors and still stayed a member of the party, and you even so thought of him as a respectable man and let him influence you in your behaviour towards your best friend." (Sources: Fritz Kraft "Im Schatten der Sensation, Leben und Wirken von Fritz Strassmann" Verlag Chemie Weinheim 1981, p 181; Paul Lawrence Rose "Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project University of California Press 1998 p 301).
There were many signs of the intensification of the policy against the jews in 1938. The plans might have solidified during the year with the result that people in cadre position were informed accordingly.

2.3.

Notice in advance 2: Inspector Engelke / Judge Berthold Löwenstein, Leipzig
In 1933 the Jewish judge Löwenstein lost his position, but kept close contacts to his freemanson brother and former superior. Contrary to earlier recommendations, Engelke advised him in January, 1938 to rather leave Germany this year. On October 29th, 1938 Engelke returned from a meeting at the Ministry of Economics in Berlin and excitedly informed his friend Löwenstein that before mid November terrible things would be done to the German Jews. He couldn't and wouldn't say more, but insisted that Löwenstein leave Germany within the next 3 days. When this turned out to be impossible he insisted on a departure before November 5th, 1938. (Source: Dr. K.J. Ball-Kaduri "Die Vorplanung der Kristallnacht" in Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden, Tel Aviv No. 4 1966 pp 211).

2.4.

Notice in advance 3: Head of Police Konrad Kaiser Berlin
The discharged Jewish head of police, Konrad Kaiser, kept close contact with his former colleagues. He testified that in June 1938 the criminal investigation department, the secret police, the local police and the revenue offices were ordered by the SS to hand in lists of Jews assigned to be deported to concentrations camps. (Sources: Dr. K.J. Ball-Kaduri "Die Vorplanung der Kristallnacht" in Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Juden, Tel Aviv, Nr. 4 2966 pp 211; Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz V. 12 Nr. 455 p 1020.) These sources prove that the cooperation of the revenue authorities could not have taken place on the night of November 9th-10th, 1938.
Questions: Is this transaction part of forming the Judenkartei according to the regulation of April 26th, 1938? Who gave the orders? Is its timing in accordance with the night of the pogrom? (Sources: Ball-Kaduri; Stapo Karlsruhe RdErl. 6.9.1935: Über die Errichtung einer Judenkartei zur Erfassung der Juden in Deutschland; ebenda J 355 Bü 238 Landespolizeiamt Württemberg RdSchr. 26.2.1936, zitiert nach "Der Novemberpogrom 1938" Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien 1988/1989 p 32).

2.5.

The re-appointing of Ernst vom Rath to Paris
Paris was vom Rath's second assignment abroad. From there he was transferred to Calcutta for a short period. In August 1938 he once again was assigned to Paris. On September 18th, 1938 he was appointed Legationssekretär.
Question: Could it be that vom Rath, who was already well known and whose farewell ceremony had already taken place was given a new role? I.e. was chosen to be the victim of an assassination and rewarded with a promotion as consolation prize?

2.6.

Preparation of the concentration camps
In spring 1938 extensive conversion of buildings started at the concentration camp in Dachau. From June 1938 onwards the same conversion took place at the two other concentration camps of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. All these expansions were terminated by end of October 1938.
Questions: Were these preparations done for the Jews that were expected on November 10th? If not, for whom? Are the initially selected perpetrators beneficiaries of the assassination and the pogrom? Would we have to denounce the announcements under 2.1-3 as false imagination? See for example Enzyklopädie des Holocaust, München 1998, Band III p 1205

2.7.

Preparations in the concentration camps
On October 25th, 1938 the SS Führer (leader) Weber of the Dachau concentration camp received the order to mark 5,000 camp uniforms with the "Judenstern" (Jewish star). At that time, there were no Jewish inmates in Dachau as they had all been deported to Buchenwald in May 1938. (Source: Hans Schwarz "Wir haben es nicht gewusst" "Erlebnisse, Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse aus dem Konzentrationslager Dachau", KZ Gedenkstätte Dachau Archiv 21.523).
Likewise at the end of October 1938, straw was delivered to Dachau and additional mattresses made available. (Source: Barbara Distel "Der Anfang vom Ende", Süddeutsche Zeitung Nr. 258 v. 9.11.1978).
Professor Dr. Hans Gamper, Landeshauptmann-Stellvertreter (Country captain deputy) Tirol and inmate at Dachau from 1938-1939 tells us in the "Tiroler Nachrichten" (newspaper) on November 13th, 1963: "Approximately two to three weeks ahead (of the Kristallnacht) a large reorganization took place at Dachau. Barracks were cleaned; a large amount of straw was brought into a shed outside the concentration camp. Together with a number of other inmates, I was ordered to stuff mattresses. For days Major Salchner and I stuffed mattresses and carried them on our backs to the camp. We were wondering for whom all these lodgings were prepared. One thing was clear to us: the National Socialists were going to do a real big viciousness ... Mid 1938 the SS ordered to start constructions for the major part of a long planned building ... On August 15th, 1938 the construction of the new camp was officially accomplished. (Source: Archiv der Gedenkstätte Dachau, Entwurf "Geschichte des KZ Dachau 2933-1945 Nr. 7300 p 30).
Inside the Dachau concentration camp a resettlement took place. All the barracks in the rear were cleared with the result that all the inmates were now cramped up in the front barracks expecting the newcomers. (Sources: Georg Zwickenpflug "Erdnah" 1947: F. Wandel "Dachau" P. 28/29 zitiert nach Hartmut Metzger "Kristallnacht", pp 38 Calver 1985).

2.8.

Preparations in Paris
Kempner (Source: s pp 76) refers us to the activities of German secret agents in the significant pubs of homosexuals in Paris and asks the question: "If the young and irritable Grynszpan was maneuvered by Naziagents" meaning the attempt to assassinate vom Rath.

2.9.

Reactions to the preparations within the SD
By order of the SS-Standartenführer Dr. Six, of November 5th, 1938: "Notiz für II/11 und II/112: After I indicated several times already that the connection to the Organisationsjudentum (Members in high ranks of Jewish organizations) does not suffice for intelligence activities I hereby ask for a detailed proposal for future handling and recruiting agents within the Jews. Deadline: 1.12.1938". It might be coincidence/destiny that Six placed this order just two days before the assassination. But maybe he had just learned about the planning behind the article in the "Schwarze Korps" of November 3rd, 1938 and his ambition was incited to act similarly.
We know as little about this, as we know nothing about what II/11 and II/112 proposed according to the order on 1.12.1938.

2.10

Well prepared measures of the SS (task of the SD) against the Jews
A paper message from a SD-Führer to the security main office of 3.28.1939 concludes well-planned preparations. (Source: Dan Michman "Preparing for occupation? ... " Studia Rosenthaliana. Vol. 32-N.2, Amsterdam University Press 1998). The proof we have for Holland is also valid for the SS policy on Jews in other countries. Should the policy on Jews in Germany before 1938 be the only one that was unplanned and left to coincidence?

3.

During: Events to be questioned between November 7th and 10th, 1938 (from the assassination until the pogrom)

3.1.

Entry to the German Embassy in Paris
Repeatedly the question was asked: how was it possible that a complete stranger, without having to show his identification which would have shown his being Jewish by name, immediately gained access to an employee of the German embassy? Even at this time, it was completely unusual and against all regulations and safety precautions of a German Embassy. These questions were never answered in a satisfactory manner. It was Hoffmann (Rudolf Hoffmann "Mord - oder Mordvortäuschung?" Lüdenscheid Skiptum FS 109 1988 p 17) who questioned these practices from a criminal/technical point of view.
Hoffmann points out what the German Ambassador Count von Welczeck concealed in his report to the Department of Foreign Affairs: That he (von Welczeck) met and spoke to Grynszpan before the assassination.

3.2.

The shots of the assassin
There is no report of witnesses who actually heard the 5 shots (Source: Rudolf Hoffmann "Mord - oder Mordvortäuschung?" Lüdenscheid 1988). The servant to the Embassy, Amtsgehilfe Nagorka, tells us in his account that he heard vom Rath screaming ("Screams and cries for help"), but he did not report that he heard any shots (Source: Kaul, p 8).
According to corresponding statements, Grynszpan shot five times, three bullets, hitting the victim. He must have been a poor marksman. He had no experience with revolvers. Yet, he used such a weapon.
Kaul, pp 8: "While examining the scene immediately after the crime, the commissioner found in vom Rath's office a bronzed revolver, 6,35 mm with a red string and the price tag still attached to the trigger, on the floor to the right of the door in a corner build by the Wandrelief (decoration on the wall). The cylinder still contained 5 cartridges. Hoffmann (p 7) concludes: "It is absolutely incompatible with evidence on site of the criminal investigation department that Grynszpan shot even one of the five cartridges! If he had shot all five cartridges the cylinder would have contained five cartridge cases! This should not be overlooked! Why should the French investigation officer make something up? He had the permission to investigate the site of crime immediately after the assassination and to examine the found weapon. Neither Lorz, Chancellor of the Embassy, nor later Professor Grimm, legal commissioner of the German Government, ever questioned the clearing procedures of the French Police. But the admission that Grynszpan was never confronted with the facts and that his testimony of having shot all five cartridges he had bought did not correspond with the investigation of the site."
Hoffmann discusses (pp 9) why the French police and the attorneys of both parties did not go deeper into the investigation of the site.
He draws our attention to the fact that Heiber and even a counsel for the defense spoke of a pistol.
In most of the interrogation protocols, Grynszpan declares that he did not want to kill, that he acted out of love to his parents, that he acted the way he had to act. Very rarely he declares that he shot. In the presence of his attorneys he declares that on November 11th and 25th, 1938 to the examining magistrate Tesnière that as an act to stir a sensation he had planned to commit suicide in the German embassy and in front of a picture of Hitler.
At the end of February, 1939 French psychiatrists confirm that Grynszpan did not plan to commit suicide. (Source: Anthony Read and David Fischer "Kristallnacht" London Michael Joseph pp 260).
Grynszpan's hand written note that allegedly was found when Grynszpan was arrested, leaves open both variants: suicide or assassination. Many of the statements are contradictory. He is not really to blame. Truth was not his guideline in this extremely difficult situation and that he tried to imagine all possibilities and intelligence. As he had to change his tactics several times compellingly there are contradictions in his statements.

3.3.

The arrest of the assassin
Grynszpan was handed over for arrest to the constable on duty outside the embassy; but an embassy is ex-territorial. There are today and were then, clear instructions how to handle crimes on embassy territories. To turn over culprits to the local authorities is unusual. To entrust the assassin to one single constable was a reckless act of negligence; it was irresponsible.
This fact has not been censured later on. It could not have happened without special instructions.
Question: Who within the German Embassy ordered the arrest by the French constable? The report of the German ambassador does not give us any information.

3.4.

Further inconsistencies in France
Hoffmann (p 10) draws our attention to the fact that Grynszpan's parting card used as proof does not speak of shots, but of "screams".
According to No. 105629 of the French Immigration, Grynszpan was already in France on August 1st, 1938 and Hoffmann asks what for and by whose order?
Further remarks by Hoffmann should support the suspicion that Grynszpan was working either for the French secret service or as a SS spy.
All contradictions: Grynszpan's travels, his illegal stay in France, the unusual protection of his parents' properties after their deportation across the borders of Poland, would all be cleared by an antithesis stating that the assassination in Paris was prepared by the SD. This steering by the SD would not have to be contradicting Hoffmann's considerations, as a cooperation of secret services as well as the infiltration of agents is possible.

3.5.

Deficiencies of the investigations in France
There had been no formal questioning of the staff at the German Embassy in Paris including the ambassador himself, of Dr. Claass (medical examiner of the German Embassy), of the French surgeon Professor Baumgartner nor the hospital staff. Missing are an identification of the wounded and then deceased Ernst vom Rath as well as any proof of bullet wounds. There is only one clinic form signed by Dr. Claass and Professor Baumgartner, but it does not show the patient's name or any other identification.
Dr. Charles Paul's autopsy is not legal (Hoffmann pp26). It states that vom Rath was hit by 2 bullets.

3.6.

Vom Rath's sick-bed
Immediately after the shooting, Hitler's personal medical examiner SS Sturmbannführer Dr. Karl Brand (sentenced to death in Nurenberg) and Professor Georg Magnus from Münster were ordered to vom Rath's sick-bed. Considering the admittedly competent treatment by Professor Baumgartner the real mission of these two men is unknown. There is understandable suspicion that the German doctors "assisted".
Questions: Who sent Dr. Karl Brand and Professor Magnus and who paid them off? Under whose order did they act? And most importantly, what did they actually do in Paris? It is peculiar that afterwards their names do not appear anymore in the files.
Ernst vom Rath's mother was sent to Paris and she was allowed to be at vom Rath's sick-bed. However, she was strictly ordered not to talk to her son.
Question: This looks like a precaution, so her son could not tell her the truth.
Vom Rath's father also came to Paris. Still in Berlin on the occasion of a visit of condolences by his neighbor, Kantor Magnus Davidson of the Fasanenstrasse Synagogue, vom Rath's father mentioned that he believes rather in a creature hired by the Nazis than a Jewish attempt. (Sources: "Die Juden in Deutschland 1933-1945", Herausgeber Wolfgang Benz, Verlag Beck München 1989 p 505; Hoffmann p 5). Obviously the possibility of a Jew hired or forced by the Nazis did not occur to him.

3.7.

Preliminary burnings of synagogues encouraging imitation
The synagogue in Kassel, Germany was already burned on the evening of November 7th (Source: Kasseler Zeitung Nr. 260 KS v. 7.11.1998). According to witnesses, "30 men wearing identical boots (hence a military formation) were marching towards the synagogue and were followed by more than 100 people." Then the synagogue was set on fire, but on November 7th there was a small note if at all and only on the last page of the newspapers. The burning of synagogues on November 7th must have been organized and ordered.
The events in Kassel (likewise in Bebra and Brandenburg) were published on November 9th as "spontaneous demonstrations in individual cities" aimed to encourage imitation.

It must be accepted that Goebbels did not initiate the events on November 7th. He only received Hitler's order (by interpretation) on the evening of November 9th.
Question: Which authority ordered the event in Kassel? Who was the executive organization?

3.8.

Transmission of the news of the death
For those times the transmission of the news of the death of vom Rath to Munich took a very long time. Vom Rath died in Paris at 4:30pm, which was 5:30pm German time. Only at about 9:00pm did the message arrive at the festivities taking place in Munich.
Suspicion: Hitler should only be informed at a moment when he was in the right mood to order measures or at least tolerate them.

3.9.

Hitler's instructions to the pogrom
There are eye witnesses, but not "ear witnesses", that upon receiving the news of von Rath's death there was a heated discussion between Hitler and Goebbels in the Bürgerbräukeller.
Thereafter Hitler left early and Goebbels gave a speech, which resulted in the listeners placing order to launch the pogrom to their units celebrating at home. Obviously Hitler did not pass strict order to Goebbels, but at the same time he did not order him to hold back. In his speech, Goebbels did not refer to Hitler. Against Hitler's will Goebbels would never have dared to speak. Obviously Goebbels went as far as he thought to be safe after Hitler's vague declaration.
At that time the relationship between Hitler and Goebbels was rather tense as according to Hitler's opinion Goebbels did not do too well handle the Sudetenkrise and was involved in a love affair Hitler did not approve of. For these reasons Goebbels wanted to make amends.
Goebbels wanted to change his image of being a man of words and transform it into being a man of action. He thought that now he had found the right field of action whose responsibilities had not yet been assigned to another authority. He was right, but the SD was working in the same direction. The SD was pulling the strings. As the SD was not yet formerly appointed, they had to leave the evening to Goebbels. The SD did this willingly because the expected consequences could be put on Goebbels. For that night the SS were ordered to stay spectators, to safeguard German property and the next day to proceed with the planned arrests.

3.10.

Gaps in the German historical research results
The allegation of the Ministry of propaganda that the pogrom was a spontaneous act of the people has since been defeated clearly by historians. The approximate number of synagogues burned in 1938 is still open but must have been larger than the 267 synagogues mostly stated. In Germany there used to be approximately 2800 synagogues and houses of worship of which only a few dozens are left. How many of them were actual victims of the pogrom? What happened to the others? (Source: NZZ, September 20th, 2000, p 65; Ball-Kaduri, p 216).
The number of Jews murdered on November 9th/10th, 1938 as well as the number of Jews deported to concentration camps are inaccurate. Unknown is the number of Jews killed in the concentration camps or dying in consequence.
In Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland only these synagogues were burned where there was no risk of other buildings catching fire. Questions: Is it technically possible to decide ad hoc by a badly organised mob in the middle of the night it for the surrounding buildings there is a danger of catching fire? Had this not needed careful clarifications beforehand?
How, when, by whom and on whose orders the fuel was provided? You can't really light a synagogue with matches!
It is proven fact that the acts of vandalism against Jewish businesses were carefully prepared. F. von Weiss, Swiss diplomat in Cologne on November 12th/13th, 1938 wrote to ambassador Frölicher about a Jewish Jewellery Shop near the Dom that was not destroyed, "because the shop had changed hand a few days ago and belonged now to a Belgian, a fact that was not openly known" (Source: Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz V.12, No 445, p 1018).

3.11.

3.11. The duties of Heydrich
At a time when I was not yet collecting information on probably hoaxed historic events and was still more interested in economy than in history I once read that Heydrich covered a special mission with a special title in the vicinity of the Reichsbank and the Ministry of Finances and that there he was occupied with German (i.e. Jewish) assets abroad with the goal to preserve Jewish savings for the Reich even so the Jewish owner were sent abroad or murdered.
It is a fact that this duty and all other anti-Jewish measures were carried out in an effective accordance. Even if my memory deceives me and it was not Heydrich himself who co-ordinated and execute himself somebody was charged to fulfil this task. This aspect of the Holocaust still is unattended to and could throw light upon the events of November, 1938.

3.12.

3.12. Propaganda / not yet followed up aspects
As a result of an information by the Swiss attorney Marcel Grimaud, Geneva, on February 1st, 1940 Grimm reports according to documents RSS/20988 pp 44 of the Federal Archives: "that at that time a Jewish film was produced in Paris showing the assassination of vom Rath as a piece of provocation by the Gestapo". This film was "digesting" material that probably did not support the thesis but gave hints of the real events.

4.

4. Afterwards: Inexplicable events after the pogrom (after November, 10th, 1938)

4.1.

The activities of the French administration of Justice
During my visit on February 3rd, 1999 to the "Archives de Documentation Juive contemporain" I read plenty of documents. In a rather confused report by a "Zuträger" to a German authority I read the following: As the French Authorities were finally willing to trial Grynszpan it proves were brought forward of the participation of the International Jew's, these proves should be produced under any circumstances. Back home I started to think closer about these words that had stayed in my mind: It can't really be that the French Authorities were only willing to trial Grynszpan if it was proven that the International community of the Jews were involved as there was a corpse and an arrest of a suspect. Could it be that the French realised that Grynszpan was not could not be the culprit / murderer or was there no corpse?
Because in any case there would have been a trial even if the murder would have been only a simple "Milieufall". If the French Authorities were of the opinion that a trial was not justifiable, the document I read must have been skilful diplomatic wording.
As I trust my memory that I did not read an official document but rather a private report, it is of no great importance. It could as well just be a case of wrong wording; a badly translated passage or a made up argument I interpreted wrongly.

4.2.

Grynszpan's escape to jail
Part of a common legend about Grynszpan is the story that Grynszpan was freed in Bourges, walked to Toulouse and as he could not find any accommodation asked for admission to the jail. The incorrectness of this legend has now been proven. At the time it was hoaxed to the German authorities who accepted it. On June 30th, 1940 the department for foreign affairs wrote to Goebbels: "Special Forces of the secret police (Kundt-commission) is following his traces". (Source: Bundesarchiv R55/20991 pp 62).
On August 16th, 1940 Diewerge reports that the French police had shown an interest in hindering the Germans to get hold of the documents of investigation and in the possibility of the culprit's escape (Source: p 73). In reality Grynszpan was never free but kept in French prisons until he was handed over to the Germans in the prison of Toulouse.
In letter 121 (without date) Grimm writes to Diewerge: "The card (farewell letter used as the proof of the psychological reasons of Grynszpan's shots) is quite a strong psychological proof to me that a third party persuaded him to write such a card ...." It is my wish that all the other still existing notes will be analysed in the same psychological manner.

4.3.

The role of the friend Naftalie Kaufmann called "Nathan"
In the letter to Diewerge of January 12th, 1939 (Bundesarchiv) Professor Grimm states that there had been "much tighter relations than expected" between Nathan and Grynszpan, a fact he says "that has not yet been examined". Unfortunately, the minutes mentioned in this letter are missing. It can safely be assumed to be one of the documents sieved out before all the documents were put together in the Bundesarchiv.
Nowhere else but in this letter we find the question raised about Grynszpan's financial situation and how he who had hardly any money could afford to buy a revolver.
Additionally there is the influence of Grynszpan's Jewish friends (Salomon Szenier, Rudolf Haas) that has never been investigated.

4.4.

At the German concentration camp
Grynszpan's preferential treatment at the concentration camp Sachsenhausen is well known. The prevention of negative statements about his stay in a concentration camp during a future show trial is meagre reasoning.

4.5.

The preparation of a "Schauprozess" that never happened
This part of the events around Grynszpan are the best documented. The whereabouts of the documents evaluated by Kaul I have not yet found out. Friedrich Karl Kaul's extensive account "Der Fall des Herschel Grynszpan", Akademie-Verlag Berlin 1965, has not been recognised in the West. It is not on me to make up for it but I would like to refer to those aspects enriching my falsification with further facts and questions.
According to the minutes of the well prepared meetings Kaul lays open the driving forces beeing the Ministries of Propaganda and Foreign Affairs. Often they try to bypass the quite reticent Ministry of Justice and the SS. It is not disclosed why the Ministry of Justice and the SS were against the Schauprozess. If it would be known we might have a hint for an antithesis. Kaul's presentation of the events (because of the situation in the DDR with similarities he had to be quite cautious) leaves ample room for the suspicion of sabotage by the SS.
The district attorney filing the possibility of homosexual contacts as well as the Sonderbeauftragte Volksgerichtshofpräsident Thierack and maybe some of the decisive officials in the Ministry of Justice were all members of the SS and had to follow those orders. Thierack's insisting on an order by the Führer and his repeatedly questioning this order even once it was given is hard to understand.
The prove of the SS finally having their way shows in the fact that Hitler withdrew his order and in consequence the Schauprozess did not take place. It is not open for speculation that the SS did not want the Schauprozess to take place because of the rivalries with the ministry of propaganda as only a few month later Thierack was appointed German minister of Justice by Hitler.
Diewerge's report of January 23rd, 1939 asks for interpretation especially regarding the reluctance of the SS and the SD towards the planned Schauprozess.
On page 17 onwards of Lautz's bill of indictment of October 16th, 1941 there are various partly contradicting "Einlassungen des Angeklagten". The last sentence of the paragraph says: "In the course of the investigation Grynszpan gave the impudent and mendacious statement that he met Gesandschaftsrat vom Rath quite some time ago and for several times was sexually abused by vom Rath". This remark is clearly an act of sabotage in favour of the SS' point of view.
The report of the meeting of January 22nd, 1942 shows the 3 constructed obstacles to prevent the Schauprozess against Grynszpan.
Head of broadcast Diewerge's report of April 2nd, 1942 to Goebbels shows the tough conflict between the two parties (i.e. the authorities pro and contra the Schauprozess. (s. p 2 and p 4 with the pleading to completely withdraw the ministry of justice). There is a hint on sabotage but of course no member of the SS could be reproached. The state attorney is accused of "gross lack of instinct".
In von Lammers letter to Thierack of April 3rd, 1942 the request of the Volksgerichtshofpräsidenten is mentioned as "by no means that urgent". Thierack's memo of May 9th, 1942 to von Lammers insists on a Führerbescheid. In his memo he refers to a document dated April 4th, 1942 which is not part of the Bundesarchiv NJ2215 anymore (s. 1.3.).
Diewerge's letter to Tiessler of April 14th, 1942 (the therein mentioned annexed letter of the minister of justice to Goebbels was not part of the Bundesarchiv R3001) shows clearly the reasons behind the applied for decision of the Führer and how prior to the Schauprozess obstacles were constructed by the ministry of justice and the SD. It is clearly documented that we have to take into account that in addition to the written documentation there was likewise statement unknown to us today.

4.6.

The controversy of homosexuality
Extract of the Führer's information of 1942 No 60 not available to me: The Jew Grynszpan admitted in a coded documentation (the so-called Grünen Hefte) that his allegation of homosexual contacts with vom Rath are incorrect (Source: Gerhard Schwab "The day the Holocaust began: the Odyssey of Herschel Grynszpan, Praeger Publishers New York 1990 pp 179). But the informer hints that the victim cultivated homosexual relations with other persons and that for these reasons his brother had lost his ranks as well as been sent to prison for one year.
According to the known pieces of puzzle to this aspect the following could be deduced: The attorney Moro-Giafferi in Paris was the first to suggest this line of defence to Grynszpan who rejected out of maybe pride. But during the investigations in Moabit when Grynszpan could not see a way out anymore he took it up anyway. To relieve his reputation and / or his conscience he confessed to his inmate as put down in the Grünen Hefte. On the other hand there is no doubt that he frequented respective places in Paris.
Some conclusions raising further questions can be drawn:
Goebbels and Hitler favoured the Schauprozess even so they were clearly informed about the possible aspect of homosexuality. Only later they decided against the trial. The reason for their changing their minds is unknown but not founded on the aspect of homosexuality as in the meantime the existence of the Grünen Hefte was known to them.
We can assume that Goebbels had the same reasons as Hitler as Goebbels was again fully accepted by Hitler so that the SS would never have dared to inform him differently. But it stays open since when Hitler knew the reason unknown to us or had he to be reminded by the SS or Goebbels.
The existence of the Grünen Hefte shows the enormous effort put into this affair by various parties (by whom in this case?) such as organising the inmate informer who wrote the Grüne Hefte.
We have no prove of the authenticity of the Grünen Hefte. If they are genuine the question arises if Grynszpan got trapped or maybe the other way round that he used the Grünen Hefte to state the reasons to defeat the trial and try to save his life.
But as it is not a proven fact yet it is too early to draw the possible but not otherwise sustained conclusion that Grynszpan went to see vom Rath to collect his "Kupplerlohn" and shot him in consequence.
The question of homosexual contacts between Grynszpan and vom Rath led to a peculiar sequel at the Soltikow trial in 1960 (Sources: article in an unnamed newspaper dated November 23rd, 1960, Archives du Centre du Documentation Juive contemporaine, Paris to be cited only by stating the source: Leopold Gutterer's letter of September 29th, 1953 to Michael Graf Solikow; Erich Wollenberg's letter of May 3rd, 1964 to Dr. vom Rath; Michael Graf Solikow's letter of September 20th, 1964 to Le Monde Juif Paris). Gutterer states that the earlier presentation was incorrect and that the Ministry of Propaganda was only correctly informed after May 1942. The Ministry then realised that a Schauprozess might have highly discredited the Government. But he did not say which facts had to be hidden as they might have harmed the Government in court.
This statement in Gutterer's letter confirms Kempner's observations of Grimm's interrogation (Source s. 1.3., p 77). The documentation of this trial is as poor as for other events. On June 9th, 2000 the state attorney of Munich wrote to me: "A corresponding event could not be identified".

4.7.

Did Grynszpan survive?
"The November pogrom 1938" Historisches Museum Wien 1988/89, pp 56.
On November 9th, 1938 Heinz Höhner writes in a letter as a fact: "in 1945 Grynszpan was deported from France but stayed on illegally and under a false name working as a filling station attendant in a suburb of Paris. During the Solikow / Rath trial end of 1960 he was in Germany". On many occasions Helmut Heiber declared that Grynszpan survived but was never able to prove it (Trude Maurer "Abschiebung und Attentat" in "Der Judenpogrom 1938" Fischer Taschenbuch 4386 April 1988 p 71; Robert Wistrich "Wer war wer im Dritten Reich" p 103; s Kaul as well; most detailed in Gerald Schwab's "The Day the Holocaust began: the Odyssey of Herschel Grynszpan Praeger New York 1990, pp 200). This question can also be considered as unsolved.
It is in no way a prove that Grynszpan's parents declared in Jerusalem during the Eichmann trial that their son had not survived and that they had never heard from him. For them he was responsible for this blameful act harming the Jews and therefore they disassociated from him and his doings. Neither is there any prove or evidence in the official declaration of death of the Amtsgericht Hannover of June 1st, 1960 declaring Grynszpan's death effective from May 8th, 1945.

5.

Remarks

5.1.

Gaps in research
The goal of some above mentioned remarks is to list gaps and omissions not yet looked into by historical researchers. There is quite a number. To sum up we cannot say that science has clarified this case. I did not followed several possible traces. If one of these traces would lead to more clarification can only be decided when they have been researched.
Any mentioning of coincidences or providence during the Nazi regime should awaken our distrust and awareness as there might have been "help".
It might be more helpful to ask the question: cui bono?

5.2.

Falsification
If there remains just one proven fact disproving the thesis the thesis still is to doubt. So if some of my facts trying to falsify the thesis prove to be wrong my falsification did not yet fail. Only if all my facts prove to be wrong or of no effect disproving the thesis my falsification would have been unsuccessful.

5.3.

Does the antithesis of German collaboration make sense?
The antithesis of German collaboration is the only one of many different antithesis that would solve all above mentioned questions and contradictions. And surely everybody can accept that it might have been Heydrich's and the SD's doing.
If such a coup would have been planned and realised by the SD, of course the placing of false traces and the eliminating all traces of the action would have been part of.
Unfortunately there is not enough secured evidence to enable us to develop an antithesis. If Heydrich succeeded in keeping such a coup disclosed (if it really was a coup) we have to admit that he succeeded in camouflaging it perfectly by destroying all evidence and traces plus placing enough false traces leading us in wrong directions and to wrong conclusions. We would have to admit that he had reached such very high levels in his doings we are not capable to comprehend nor follow even intellectually. In general this reasoning is valid as well for other events and facts of the Hitler regime still not clearly understood today.
The Reichstagsbrand as causing event for the round-up of Communist and other members of the Reichstag is to this day a not solved case. Van der Lubbe can to certain extend ascribed the same role as Grynszpan.
The assault of Gleiwitz used as pretext for the attack on Poland releasing World War II is proven as a cause crated by the SS.

5.4.

proceeding
As long as we are not in a position to come up with an antithesis that cannot be falsified we have but the choice of collecting and analysing further contradicting facts. The more facts not corresponding with the thesis come up the more suspicion we have to apply to the thesis.
Please let me have your remarks, thoughts or even falsification of the so far mentioned facts: Dr. Vincent C. Frank, Fax: ++41 61 361 79 70; e-mail: frank.basel@freesurf.ch.

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